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NOTES
OHIO'S UNIFORM EMINENT DOMAIN ACT:
TRANSFER OF TITLE AND POSSESSION
The enactment of the Ohio Uniform Eminent Domain Act by the
last general assembly revolutionized eminent domain procedure in
Ohio.' The act has been designated the Uniform Eminent Domain Act
because its primary purpose is to provide a uniform judicial proceed-
ing whenever private property is taken for public use.' The purpose
of this note is to examine the objectives of the act and to evaluate
provisions relating to transfer of title and possession in terms of these
objectives 3
I. OBJc.CTWvS OF THE ACT
In order to understand the objectives of the act, it is first neces-
sary to appreciate the function of the courts in the exercise of eminent
domain. Essentially, eminent domain is the taking of private property
for public use without the consent of the owner.' Hence, the law of
eminent domain represents an attempt to reconcile a fundamental con-
flict between private property owners and the power of the state. This
conflict is clearly recognized in article I, section 19 of the Ohio Con-
stitution which provides: "Private property shall ever be held invio-
late, but subservient to the public welfare." Since the exercise of
eminent domain does produce such direct conflict between private
property and the power of the state, it comes as no surprise that the
judiciary has traditionally played an important role in its exercise. At
one time the judiciary was the primary arbiter of the conflict. Armed
with the concept of public use, it determined when the public interest
1 Amended Senate Bill No. 94 enacted § 163.01-.22, amended one hundred and ten
sections, and repealed one hundred and four sections of the Ohio Revised Code effective
January 1, 1966.
2 Ohio Rev. Code § 163.02 provides: "All appropriations of real property, except
as otherwise authorized by this section, shall be made pursuant to §§ 163.01 to 163.22,
inclusive of the Revised Code."
The exceptions set forth in § 163.02 permit the director of highways to appropriate
pursuant to §§ 5519.01-.06; a conservancy district to appropriate pursuant §§ 6101.01-.84;
and a sanitary district to appropriate pursuant to §§ 6115.01-.79 of the Ohio Revised Code.
It is hoped that each of these agencies will choose to utilize the uniform procedure so that
complete uniformity can be attained.
3 For a thorough section by section analysis of the act, see Kirkwood, Ohio Uniform
Eminent Domain Act (1966).
4 1 Nichols, Eminent Domain § 1.11 (3d ed. 1964).
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required that a man's property be wrested from himP Since that time,
public use has become almost entirely a legislative or administrative
question." This change in the judiciary's role resulted partly from the
general acceptance of new ideas about the proper relationship between
the judiciary and the other branches of government. But also, the need
for public land has rapidly increased under the pressure of expanded
governmental services, urban renewal projects, and highway construc-
tion. As a result, the determination of public need has arguably become
too complex for the judicial process. Although the judiciary may no
longer be responsible for determining when private property shall be
converted to public use, it still plays an important role in the exercise
of eminent domain. In the first place, the Ohio Constitution, like many
other state constitutions, requires that a land owner be justly compen-
sated for his property and that the amount of compensation be deter-
mined by a jury.' Thus, the courts are entrusted with the function of
ensuring that a land owner is paid just compensation for his property.
The courts have also been delegated the equally important function of
administering the transfer of title and possession from private persons
to the appropriating agency. The performance of this second function
by the courts is required because the exercise of eminent domain is
an involuntary transfer of property. While a voluntary transfer can
be administered by the parties themselves, the involuntary transfer
requires the intervention of the court to harmonize the competing in-
terests of the parties. Both the function of administering the transfer
of title and possession and the function of ensuring just compensation
require balancing the interests of land owners and the public. The
courts are responsible for striking the proper balance.
The functions of the judiciary are carried out within the frame-
work of an appropriation proceeding prescribed by the legislature. The
appropriation procedures in existence prior to the effective date of the
recent Ohio act demonstrated that unfair and inefficient procedures
could prevent the courts from properly performing their functions. An
examination of the state of the law prior to the passage of the new act
5 Nichols, "The Meaning of Public Use in the Law of Eminent Domain," 20 B.U.L.
Rev. 615 (1940).
6 State ex rel. Gordon v. Rhodes, 156 Ohio St. 81, 100 N.E.2d 225 (1951).
The determination of what constitutes a public purpose is primarily a legislative
function, subject to review by the courts when abused, and the determination of
the legislative body of that matter should not be reversed except in instances
where such determination is palpably and manifestly arbitrary and incorrect.
Id. at 92, 100 N.E.2d at 231. See Comment, "The Public Use Limitation on Eminent
Domain: An Advance Requiem," 58 Yale L.J. 599 (1948).
7 Ohio Const. art. I, § 19 and art. XIII, § 5.
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reveals the reasons for its enactment. The Ohio legislature had granted
the power of eminent domain to fifteen different private and govern-
mental agencies.8 The number and variety of appropriation procedures
used by these agencies had multiplied haphazardly as the need for
public lands grew. At the time of the enactment of the Uniform Act
there were fourteen separate, distinct, and complete procedures by
which eminent domain could be exercised, 9 making it difficult for land-
owners and appropriating agencies to know whether they were follow-
ing the correct procedure."0 Litigation over procedural technicalities
was excessive. The number and variety hindered the evaluation of the
procedures and encouraged their misuse. For these reasons the Ohio
Legislative Service Commission and the Eminent Domain Committee
of the Ohio Bar Association recognized the need for a uniform pro-
cedure which could be used whenever eminent domain was exercised."
Furthermore, sentiment for reform was created by outdated procedures
which produced bottlenecks in important public projects and which
levied undue hardships on land owners. 2 The recognition of the need
for uniformity and reform culminated in the enactment of Ohio's
Uniform Eminent Domain Act. Whether the act permits the courts to
perform properly their functions of ensuring just compensation and
administering transfer of title and possession is yet to be determined.
Since the fairness and efficiency of Ohio's Uniform Act are deter-
8 Ohio Legal Center Instit., Reference Manual for Real Estate Conference IHI:
Eminent Domain 1.01 (1966).
9 Ohio Legis. Serv. Comm'n, Research Report No. 14, Eminent Domain in Ohio 4
(1956).
10 The Legislative Service Commission concluded: "Ohio's Eminent domain law is
confusing even to the most experienced lawyer because it consists of hundreds of sections
scattered throughout the Revised Code." Id. at 3.
11 The Ohio Legislative Service Commission recommended the adoption of a uniform
procedure in its research report on the law of eminent domain submitted in 1956.
Research Report No. 14, op. cit. supra note 9, at 16. The eminent domain committee of
the Ohio Bar Association then undertook the task of drafting the proposed bill and
urging its enactment. Kirkwood, op. cit. supra note 3, at 2. Several other states have also
recently felt the need for a uniform procedure. See, e.g., Kentucky Research Comm'n,
Research Report No. 24, Eminent Domain Procedure (1965); joint State Gov't Comm'n,
Pennsylvania Proposed Eminent Domain Law (1962); Virginia Advisory Legis. Council,
House Document No. 11, Revision of Eminent Domain Laws (1961); Comment,
"Modernizing Illinois Eminent Domain Procedures," 48 Nw. UX. Rev. 484 (1953).
12 Ohio Legis. Serv. Comm'n, op. cit. supra note 9, at 13: Comment, "Eminent
Domain: Corduroy Road to Ohio's Super Highways," 9 W. Res. L. Rev. 457 (1958). For
examples of the recent movement for reform in other states see the articles and pamphlets
cited in note 11, supra. See also California Law Revision Comm'n, Possession and Passage
of Title in Eminent Domain Proceedings (1960); Highway Research Board, Special
Report No. 32, Condemnation of Property for Highway Purposes (1958).
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mined by balancing the competing interests of landowners and appro-
priating agencies, it is important that these interests be understood.
If either party is able to use the proceeding as a club to coerce an
unjust settlement, the purpose of the proceeding is defeated. Likewise,
neither party should be afforded an unfair advantage in presenting its
case to the jury. The appropriation agency is interested in immediate
possession of the property so that it can begin improving and using
the property without the delay caused by litigation. Owners, on the
other hand, want adequate time to relocate. The agency seeks to min-
imize the cost of appropriation, while the landowner generally feels
that the agency's offers are wholly inadequate. The task confronting
the draftsmen of the Ohio act was to blend these competing interests
into a fair and efficient proceeding.
The Ohio Constitution provided the foundation upon which the
act was built. The constitution requires that compensation be assessed
by a jury. 3 Therefore, one objective of the act is to provide pro-
cedures which will increase the probability of a fair and just assess-
ment. The constitution also places restrictions upon the time at which
the property can be transferred to the appropriating agency.14 Except
for two specified instances, compensation must be assessed by a jury
and paid or secured by deposit before the agency may take possession
of the property. An agency may take possession before trial only when
the property is "taken in time of war or other public exigency, impera-
tively requiring its immediate seizure or for the purpose of making
or repairing roads which shall be open to the public without charge."-
Therefore, a second objective of the Uniform Act is to transfer prop-
erty to the appropriating agency as quickly as the constitution and a
fair consideration of the owner's interests will permit. The succeeding
paragraphs will examine the provisions of the act relating to transfer
of title and possession and will suggest an interpretation of those pro-
visions which will be consistent with the objectives of the act.
II. Timr, CONDITIONS, AND EXTENT OF POSSESSION
The voluntary transfer of property by sale or gift is a relatively
simple operation because it is based upon the mutual agreement of
the parties. But a transfer pursuant to an exercise of eminent domain
is more complex because it is an involuntary transfer carried out
within the framework of a judicial proceeding. The complexity is
enhanced by the necessity of balancing the agency's need for imme-
13 Ohio Const. art. I, § 19 and art. XIII, § 5.
14 Ohio Const. art. I, § 19 and art. XIII, § 5.
15 Ohio Const. art. I, § 19.
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diate possession against the owner's need for a reasonable time to
relocate. The first questions which will be considered are at what time,
upon what conditions, and to what extent may an appropriating agency
take possession of property under the Uniform Act.
A. Preliminary Surveys
An appropriation proceeding is commenced when an agency files
a petition in the common pleas or probate court of the county where
the land is situated. 6 The first question considered is to what extent
the agency can enter upon the land before it files its petition. Often
the agency needs to make surveys for the preparation of plans and
appraisals for use in negotiations with the owner. Can entries be made
for these purposes before the appropriation proceeding is formally
commenced? Section 163.03 provides that if the agency gives the re-
quired notice, its entry for such purposes will not constitute a trespass.
Nevertheless, it must reimburse the owner for any actual damage
caused by the entry. If the agency and owner are unable to agree upon
the amount of damages, the owner may seek to recover his losses in
a separate action. This right to make preliminary surveys is valuable
to the agency, but the courts should not permit it to be abused. The
landowner should be permitted as much privacy as the public interest
will permit.' 7 Hence, he should be able to recover damages for trespass
if he is not given proper notice or if the entry is unnecessary. This
interpretation of section 163.03 conforms with the rule that a statute
in derogation of personal or property rights should be strictly con-
strued.' Furthermore, the agency should not be permitted to leave its
equipment on the land any longer than is necessary to accomplish a
purpose permitted by the statute. Arguably, such action would con-
stitute a temporary taking. 9 If there is a taking, the constitution re-
quires that the owner be compensated." If section 163.03 were con-
strued to limit a landowner's right to be compensated for a taking,
it would violate the constitution.2
B. Immediate Possession
The next question considered is how soon after it files its petition
may the agency take possession of the property. The Uniform Act
incorporates the restrictions upon immediate possession contained in
16 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 163.01(B) and .05 (Page Supp. 1965).
17 Ohio Legis. Serv. Comm'n, op. cit. supra note 9, at 9.
18 50 Am. Jur. Statutes §§ 399, 400 (1944).
19 Schneider v. Brown, 33 Ohio App. 269, 169 N.E. 307 (1929).
20 Ohio Const. art. I, § 19 and art. XIII, § 5.
21 Miami Conservancy Dist. v. Bowers, 100 Ohio St. 317, 125 N.E. 876 (1919).
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the constitution.2 2 Thus, section 163.06 permits the agency to take pos-
session before trial only when land is imperatively needed in time of
war or other public exigency or when it is taken for the purpose of
making or repairing roads open to the public without charge. In all
other situations the agency may not take possession until compensa-
tion has been assessed by the jury, the amount of the verdict has been
paid to the owner or deposited with the court, and an order granting
possession to the agency has been entered by the court 3
Even if an agency is permitted by the constitution to take imme-
diate possession, it may not do so until it has complied with the re-
quirements of section 163.06. The first requirement is that the agency
must file a declaration of intention with its petition. The purpose of
the declaration is to give the court and the owner notice of the agency's
desire to take immediate possession. If the agency does not desire
immediate possession it need not file a declaration. But if it does file,
it should be bound by its manifestation of intention.24 The owner
should be entitled to know what the agency intends and to rely upon
its manifestations of intention so that he can adjust his relocation plans
accordingly. Although section 163.06(B) expressly provides for the
filing of a declaration in the case of a taking for the purpose of making
or repairing roads, section 163.06(A) fails to mention the declaration
in the case of a taking in time of war or other public exigency. Since
the reasons for filing a declaration are equally persuasive in both cases,
the failure to mention the declaration in the latter instance was un-
doubtedly a legislative oversight.2 5 A declaration should be required
whenever an agency takes immediate possession.
22 Ohio Const. art. I, § 19 and art. XIII, § 5.
23 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 163.15 (Page Supp. 1965).
24 For example, § 163.21 provides that if an agency abandons the proceedings it is
liable for such amounts of witness fees, attorney fees, and other actual expenses as the
court deems just. Arguably, other actual expenses could include reimbursment for
relocation costs made in reliance upon the agency's declaration of intention. Smith v.
Erie Rd. Co., 134 Ohio St. 135, 16 N.E.2d 310 (1938), recognized that recovery for
damages resulting from an abandonment might be permitted if a wrongful act and
resulting injury were shown. The California Code permits the court to prohibit abandon-
ment if a party's position has substantially and detrimentally changed in justifiable
reliance upon the proceedings. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 1255a(b) (West Supp. 1965).
25 This interpretation is supported by an analysis of related sections which indicate
that a declaration of intention must be filed in order for an agency to obtain default
judgment. Section 163.09 provides for default judgment in the amount of the deposit as
set forth in the petition. Since § 163.05 does not require this amount to be set forth in the
petition, and since § 163.12 clearly indicates that it should not be set forth in the petition
because of its possible misuse by the jury, § 163.09 is obviously referring to the amount
required to be set forth in the declaration of intention.
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After it files its declaration of intention, the agency must comply
with two other requirements before it may take immediate possession
under section 163.06. It is required to deposit with the court an amount
which it considers to be just compensation for the property.20 The
purpose of requiring a deposit is to provide immediate compensation
which the owner can withdraw and use to finance the cost of his relo-
cation. The amount withdrawn is deducted from the amount of the
final verdict. In order to protect the agency against possible loss if the
deposit should exceed the amount of the verdict, the act provides that
the land owner may not withdraw more than eighty per cent of the
deposit.2 7 It would seem that in addition the landowner should be
protected against the possibility of an unreasonably small deposit.28
The purpose of requiring a deposit would be defeated if an agency
could take possession after making a nominal deposit. Therefore, a
court should refuse to enter an order granting possession to the agency
if it finds that the deposit was not a reasonable and good faith esti-
mate of just compensation. This interpretation of the court's power is
supported by the language of the statute. Section 163.06 provides that
the deposit shall be the value of the property as determined by the
agency. On the one hand, this section seems to require that the value
of the property be deposited. On the other hand, it seems to give the
agency the right to determine the amount. Considering the agency's
interest in a minimal determination, there is sufficient ambiguity in
the provision to permit the courts to construe it to mean that the
agency shall make the initial determination of value subject to the
power of the court to deny the right of immediate possession if the
amount deposited is not a good faith and reasonable estimate of value.
This interpretation is supported by decisions construing section 258 (a)
of the United States Code.29
The final requirement for immediate possession under section
163.06 is the court's entry of an order of possession. Although section
163.06 does not expressly make a court order a prerequisite to pos-
26 According to the language of the statute, which is based on prior case law, just
compensation includes the value of the property taken plus the damages, if any, to the
residue. Damages to the residue arise when there is a taking of part of a larger parcel.
The jury is asked to determine the shrinkage in value to the remainder caused by the
partial taking. 1 Richards and Knepper, Ohio judicial Conveyances and Eminent Domain,
§§ 746-48 (1960).
27 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 163.06(C) (Page Supp. 1965).
28 Several other states afford this protection to the owner. See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Proc.
Code 1243.5 (West Supp. 1965); Ill. Ann. Stat. tit. 47, § 2.2 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1965).
29 United States v. 51.8 Acres of Land, 147 F. Supp. 356 (E.D.N.Y. 1956); United
States v. 48,752.77 Acres of Land, 50 F. Supp. 563 (D. Neb. 1943).
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session, section 163.15 provides that when an agency is entitled to
possession the court shall enter an order to such effect upon the record,
and, if necessary, process shall be issued to place the agency in pos-
session. For the reasons hereafter mentioned, the date of the agency's
right to possession should be fixed by court order. Therefore, section
163.15 should be construed to require that an order of possession be
entered before immediate possession may be taken under section
163.06. Before granting the order, the court should determine if the
agency is in fact entitled to immediate possession. The court may find
that immediate possession is not allowed by the constitution. The
agency may have failed to file a declaration of intention with its peti-
tion, or its deposit may not have been a reasonable and good faith
estimate of value. If a court should refuse to consider these questions,
great harm could be inflicted upon the owner by an agency's unlawful
entry upon his land. Both the landowner and the agency are protected
if the court considers these questions before entering an order granting
possession to the agency."0 When determining whether an order of
possession should be granted, the court should also consider whether
immediate possession would cause undue hardship to the owner. It may
be apparent that the agency's right to possession should be postponed
for several weeks while the owner has an opportunity to locate else-
where. An obvious purpose of the act is to preclude either party from
obtaining an unfair advantage in negotiations. The courts should not
permit an agency to use its right of possession to compel the owner
to concede to an unjust settlement. A liberal interpretation of the
courts' discretion would further the objectives of the act.
C. Structures
Even though an agency is permitted by the constitution to take
immediate possession and even though it has complied with the three
requirements of section 163.06, the extent of the agency's right to pos-
session may be limited. This limitation relates to the right to take
immediate possession of structures situated on the land. Section 163.06
(B) provides that an agency appropriating property for the purpose
of making or repairing roads may take possession and remove struc-
tures sixty days after service of summons upon the land owner.
Although section 163.06(A) does not permit immediate possession of
structures in any other situation, section 719.33 allows for possession
30 Other states have made express provision for a hearing to determine if an agency
is entitled to immediate possession. See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1243.5 (West Supp.
1965); Ill. Ann. Stat. tit. 47, § 2.3 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1969); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 26,
§ 1-406 (Supp. 1965); Va. Code Ann. § 25-46.17 (1964).
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of structures six months after service where land is taken by munici-
palities for urban renewal projects. Since section 163.02 provides that
"all appropriations of real property, except as otherwise authorized by
this section, shall be made pursuant to sections 163.01 to section
163.22," it is apparent that section 719.33 was overlooked by the
draftsmen of the act. In order to avoid defeating legislative intent,
courts should permit immediate possession of structures pursuant to
section 719.33 until the conflict is resolved by appropriate legislation. 1
The Uniform Act's special treatment of structures is based on
two reasons which require further examination. The first reason is that
the agency's possession or removal of structures before trial interferes
with the valuation of the property. A party is ordinarily entitled to
have the jury view the premises. It is felt that if the jury can view the
premises with the structures still intact, it is more likely to reach a
just verdict." Thus, structures may be removed before trial only in
the case of road and urban renewal projects. Moreover, in these two
cases, an elaborate procedure is provided for preserving evidence of
the structures' value. Section 163.06 provides that upon motion of the
agency the court shall have appraisals made, shall cause pictures to
be taken, and shall compile a complete description of the structures.
It would seem that if the agency attempted to take possession of the
structures without first filing the motion, its entry would be unlawful.
The procedure was clearly designed for the protection of both parties.
Its purpose was to provide a substitute for a party's right to have the
jury view the premises with the structures intact. Since neither party
is intended to gain an unfair advantage from the removal of structures
before trial, the procedure should be construed to be a prerequisite to
immediate possession of structures. It may seem curious that the Ohio
act places so much importance upon the jury's view of the premises
since the Ohio courts have long held that the view is not evidence in
the case.33 Arguably, however, the required data helps the jury under-
stand the testimony of expert witnesses. If it does, the cost of the
31 Corrective legislation may be unnecessary for two reasons. First, § 719.33 may
be unconstitutional. Whether an urban renewal project constitutes a public exigency
within the meaning of article I, § 19 is apparently an unsettled constitutional question.
Second, the act is not effective after November 1, 1970. 130 Ohio Laws 1780 (1963).
32 In re Appropriation for Highway Purposes, 90 Ohio App. 471, 107 N.E.2d 387
(1951). See Duffey, "Condemnation of Structures," 16 Ohio St. L.J. 462 (1955) ; Comment,
'"minent Domain: Corduroy Road to Ohio's Super Highways," 9 W. Res. L. Rev. 457
(1958).
33 Zanesville, Marietta & Parkersburg Rd. v. Bolen, 76 Ohio St. 376, 81 N.E. 681
(1907).
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procedure is justified. But if neither party plans to use the data in its
presentation to the jury, the procedure should be waivable by mutual
consent.
The second reason for the special treatment of structures is that
the land owner needs a reasonable time to relocate his home or busi-
ness. There is a distinction between permitting an agency to take
immediate possession of the land and permitting it to take immediate
possession of the structures upon the land. While the agency's imme-
diate possession of the land surrounding the structures may be annoy-
ing to the owner, the public interest arguably requires that he bear
the annoyance. But if he were additionally required to evacuate the
structures immediately, he would be forced to move his home or busi-
ness at a moment's notice. The existence of such a threat would place
the owner at a distinct disadvantage in negotiations. For this reason
the act recognizes the owner's need for a reasonable time to relocate
by postponing the agency's right to take possession of structures. Only
when land is taken for roads or urban renewal projects may structures
be taken before trial. In both of these cases the statute should be
interpreted to permit the owner adequate time to relocate. Section
719.33 provides that the agency shall not take possession of land and
structures until six months after service. But section 163.06(B) grants
the agency the power to take immediate possession of both land and
structures. It also provides, however, that the owner shall vacate the
structures within sixty days. In order to strike a just balance between
the agency's interest in immediate possession and the owner's interest
in a reasonable time for relocation, section 163.06(B) should be con-
strued to postpone the agency's right to take possession of the struc-
tures for sixty days.
A problem is raised by permitting the agency to take possession
of the land and at the same time postponing its right to take possession
of the structures. At what point does the agency's right to the land
conflict with the owner's right to the structures? If the reasons for the
separate treatment of land and structures are considered, it would seem
that the agency should be permitted to do anything it wishes with the
land so long as it doesn't substantially interfere with the owner's right
to maintain his home or business on the premises during the relocation
period. It is suggested that upon motion of either party the courts
should determine what constitutes substantial interference. In this
manner a just balance can be found between the agency's desire for
immediate possession and the owner's need for a reasonable time to
relocate.
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III. CONSEQUENCES OF TAKING POSSESSION
The next question considered is what are the consequences of the
agency's taking possession. This question raises the crucial problem of
determining what event establishes the date of taking. Establishment
of the date of taking is important for several reasons: first, section
163.21 provides that if the agency has taken possession, it may not
abandon the proceedings. Second, section 163.17 provides that when
an agency takes possession before trial, interest on that part of the
verdict which was not withdrawable runs from the date of taking.
Third, sections 319.20 and 319.201 provide that taxes shall be appor-
tioned as of the date ownership is transferred. Fourth, case law prior
to the act established the rule that if possession is taken before trial,
the property is valued as of the date of taking. The problem is to
choose an ascertainable date of taking which is consistent with the
purposes of the act.
A. Date of Taking Before Trial
According to case law prior to the act, the date of taking is the
date of trial unless possession is taken before trial.' The first question
considered will be what event establishes possession before trial under
the new law. Case law prior to the act indicated that a taking may
occur in either of two situations: first, an entry upon the land which
manifests an intent to exercise dominion over the property,31 or second,
an entry upon the land which tonstitutes a substantial interference
with the owner's right to use and enjoy the property. In either situ-
ation a physical entry is required. But the characterization of a par-
ticular entry as a taking often involves a difficult factual determina-
tion. This difficulty is compounded under the Uniform Act because
section 163.03 permits the agency to enter for the purpose of making
surveys, soundings, drillings, appraisals, and examinations. The policy
behind the law of conveyancing would seem to require that a transfer
of property be evidenced by a more formal and definitive event. An
event which meets these objections to the prior case law rule is the
entry on the record of the court order granting possession to the
agency3 7 It is clear that by obtaining the order, the agency manifests
an intent to take dominion and substantially interferes with the owner's
34 Director of Highways v. Olrich, 5 Ohio St. 2d 70, 213 N.E.2d 823 (1966).
35 Cincinnati v. Smallwood, 106 Ohio App. 496, 150 N.E.2d 310 (1958).
30 Director of Highways v. Joseph Evans Ice Cream Co., 167 Ohio St. 463, 150
N.E.2d 30 (1958); City of Norwood v. Sheen, 126 Ohio St. 482, 186 N.E. 102 (1933).
37 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 163.15 (Page Supp. 1965).
1966]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 27
right to use and enjoy the property.8 After the order has been entered
by the court, he no longer has any legal right to possession. He can
be lawfully evicted at a moment's notice. After that it can no longer
realistically be said that he has any dominion or control over the prop-
erty.89 For these reasons the courts should hold that the date of taking
before trial is established by the court order granting possession to the
agency. Therefore, after that date the agency should not be permitted
to abandon the proceedings." Moreover, interest should commence, 4'
taxes should be apportioned,42 and the date of valuation should ordi-
narily be established as of that date.4"
The above analysis raises a problem which requires further con-
sideration. How can the order granting possession to the lands estab-
lish the date of taking if the owner retains the right to remain in the
structures? If title vests in the agency at the date of the order of pos-
session, it would seem that an occupant of the structures after that
date should be liable for rent.44 A solution to this problem is reached
by balancing the agency's interest in immediate possession against the
owner's interest in a reasonable period for relocation. Arguably, the
act gives the land owner a tenancy in the structures at the agency's
expense during the relocation period. By excusing the payment of rent,
38 In re Appropriation for Highway Purposes, 90 Ohio App. 471, 104 N.E.2d 186
(1951), held that filing of a resolution and finding by the director of highways did not
fix the date of taking. A resolution and finding required by section 5519.01 should,
however, be distinguished from the declaration of intention required by § 163.06. The
former is used both to initiate the proceedings and to permit immediate possession. The
latter is used solely for the purpose of manifesting an intention to take immediate
possession. Unlike the resolution and finding the declaration of intention need not be
filed if the agency does not desire immediate possession.
39 See California Law Revision Comm'n, op. cit. supra note 12, at B-45:
If the condemnor fails to take physical possession after obtaining an order
of immediate possession, the order itself is an effective block to the owner's use
of the property. Since the condemnor may at any time thereafter enter upon and
use the property, the cloud that hangs over the property dearly prevents the
condemnee from doing anything with it. It is an exaggeration to say that he
still owns the property.
40 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 163.21 (Page Supp. 1965).
41 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 163.17 (Page Supp. 1965).
42 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 319.20, .201 (Page Supp. 1965).
43 Director of Highways v. Olrich, supra note 34, reaffirmed the established case law
rule that the property is valued as of the date of trial unless possession is taken prior
thereto. But there may be circumstances when the date of valuation should not coincide
with the date of taking. City of Cleveland v. Carcione, 118 Ohio App. 525, 190 NYE.2d
52 (1963).
44 The Illinois act permits a court upon a finding of undue hardship to postpone the
agency's right to take possession. But the owner is required to pay a reasonable rental
while he remains on the premises. Ill. Ann. Stat. tit. 47, § 2.3 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1965).
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the act affords the owner some compensation for the expense and hard-
ship of relocation4 During the land owner's tenancy, the agency has
the right to proceed with its project so long as it doesn't substantially
interfere with the owner's right to maintain his home or business upon
the premises during the relocation period. The entry of a court order
of possession should constitute a taking subject to the tenancy granted
by the act to the land owner.
B. Date of Taking at Time of Trial
Next to be considered is the case law rule that if there is no prior
taking, the taking occurs at the time of trial.4" The constitution ex-
pressly provides that except in the two instances where immediate
possession is expressly allowed, property may not be taken until com-
pensation is first paid or secured by deposit.47 Therefore, the case law
rule conflicts with the language of the constitution since compensation
is ordinarily not paid or deposited with the court until some time after
the trial. But aside from its constitutional infirmities, the case law rule
seems incompatible with section 163.15 of the Uniform Act. That sec-
tion provides that the agency shall have no right to take possession
until after it either pays the amount of the award to the owner or
deposits it with the court. Payment need not occur until months after
the trial. In fact possession by the agency might never occur because
section 163.21 permits the agency to abandon the proceedings up to
ninety days after judgment. If the case law rule were applied to the
Uniform Act, the vesting of title to the property would have no rela-
tion to the right of possession. Taxes would be apportioned as of the
date of trial even though the agency might not take possession until
three months later. For these reasons it is clear that if the case law
rule is followed under the Uniform Act, it will be based upon a fiction.
In a realistic sense, the taking does not occur until the agency has the
right to take possession of the property.
A closer examination of the cases enunciating the rule reveals
why the date of taking was fixed at the time of trial. These cases were
concerned with the date on which the property should be valued.48
45 The traditional rules for arriving at just compensation fail to recognize many
losses caused to the owner by an exercise of eminent domain. Comment, "Eminent Domain
in an Age of Redevelopment: Incidental Losses," 67 Yale L.J. 61 (1957).
46 Director of Highways v. Olrich, supra note 34.
47 Ohio Const. art. I, § 19 and art. XIII, § 5.
48 Director of Highways v. Olrich, supra note 34; Director of Highways v. Joseph
Evans Ice Cream Co., supra note 36; Nichols v. City of Cleveland, 104 Ohio St. 19, 135
N.E. 291 (1922); Board of Educ. v. Hecht, 102 Ohio App. 521, 130 N.E.2d 107 (1955);
In re Appropriation of Easement for Highway Purposes, 90 Ohio App. 471, 107 N.E.2d
387 (1951).
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
The jury must value the property as of a certain date. The valuation
date is important because it determines which party must bear casualty
losses. It also establishes for what improvements the owner may be
compensated. Furthermore, fluctuations in market price are fixed as
of the date of valuation. There are sound reasons for making the trial
the date of valuation. In the first place, this is the date at which the
jury views the premises, and it can be argued that the property should
be valued as of the date it is examined by the jury.49 Furthermore,
expediency would seem to require that the property be valued no later
than the time of trial. Otherwise the jury would be compelled to spec-
ulate on the future value of the property. What if there were a casualty
loss after trial but before the date of valuation, or the owner added
an improvement? What if the real estate market suddenly collapsed?
None of these factors would have been considered by the jury. Argu-
ably, a new trial would be necessary. In order to avoid this difficulty,
the date of valuation should continue to be fixed no later than the time
of trial. But this does not mean that the taking must occur at the time
of trial. Although prior to the act the courts generally assumed that
the date of valuation and the date of taking were inseparable, there
is no reason why the two dates must coincide under the Uniform Act.
Under the act there is clearly no taking until the court enters an order
granting possession to the agency. 0 This may not occur until long after
the trial. Nonetheless very practical reasons require that the date of
valuation be fixed no later than the date of trial. The courts should
recognize that the two dates are based on different considerations. An
appropriation proceedings serves two functions. One function is to en-
sure that the owner receives just compensation. The date of valuation
relates to this function. A separate function is to administer the trans-
fer of title and possession from the owner to the appropriating agency.
The date of taking relates to this second function. The determination
of each date should be based on different considerations. The date of
taking should be established when the right of possession to the prop-
erty is transferred to the agency, but the transfer of possession is just
one of many factors which should be considered in establishing a fair
and expedient date of valuation.
C. Date of Valuation
The failure of the courts to recognize that the date of valuation
need not coincide with the date of taking has resulted in injustices
and unclear analyses of cases. The reasoning of two Ohio cases will
49 in re Appropriation for Highway Purposes, supra note 48.
50 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 163.15 (Page Supp. 1965).
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be compared to illustrate the problem. In both Akron v. Alexander51
and City of Cleveland v. Carcione,5" the jury was asked to value a
building which, as of the date of trial, was situated in the midst of a
desolate urban renewal project. The building was dilapidated and had
been the victim of vandalism. When the urban renewal project was
commenced, the building stood in the midst of a busy neighborhood-
At that time it was occupied and reasonably maintained. But in both
cases the jury was instructed to value the property as of the date of
trial. In accordance with a long established rule of valuation, the jury
was also told that the property should be valued as if the urban re-
newal project had never been commenced. 3 In each case the trial
court was requested to permit the jury to view the premises. Both
Carcione and Alexander held that despite the apparent mandatory
language of the statute, the trial court had power to deny a request
that the jury view the premises. The divergent reasoning of the two
decisions illustrates the difficulty courts have had in separating the
date of taking and the date of valuation. In Alexander the supreme
court reaffirmed the traditional rule that the property should be valued
as of the time of trial since that was the date of taking, but held that
a trial court could refuse to grant a request that the jury view the
premises if that view would be prejudicial to the owner. The court's
application of the traditional rule in Alexander was based upon a fic-
tion. The reason for saying that the date of taking occurs at the time
of trial is that there are practical reasons for fixing the date of valua-
tion at the time of trial and it is assumed that the date of taking must
coincide with the date of valuation. But by denying the jury a view
of the premises, the court removed the reason for valuing the property
at the time of trial. Therefore, there was no reason why the taking
must occur at the time of trial. The reasoning of the court of appeals
in Carcione is more persuasive. The court held that due to the circum-
stances of the case the property should be valued at a date just prior
to the initiation of the urban renewal project. It recognized the rule
that property is valued at the time of trial, but then stated:
However, the application of that rule of law may result in an award
of compensation to the owner of the property appropriated, which
is unreasonable and unjust under unusual facts and circumstances,
as are present at bar. Under such circumstances, the time as of
which the valuation of the property should be made must comport
with the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case so as to assure
51 5 Ohio St. 2d 75, 214 N.E.2d 89 (1966).
52 Supra note 43.
53 Nichols v. City of Cleveland, supra note 48.
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the owner of the property compensation in money which is just as
contemplated by the constitution of Ohio.
The reasoning of Carcione represented a breakthrough in judicial
thought and its application should be extended. In contrast the reason-
ing of the Ohio Supreme Court's recent decision in Director of High-
ways v. Olrich,14 which reaffirmed the traditional rule, seems oblivious
to the real considerations involved in fixing the date of valuation. It
is most unfortunate that in Olrich the court limited the Carcione rea-
soning to its facts.
In factual situations like Carcione, Olrich, and Alexander, the
reasoning of the supreme court is unsatisfactory for several reasons:
(1) A practical reason for valuing the property as of the time of trial
is that the jury views the premises at that date. But if the jury is not
permitted to view the premises because the view would be prejudicial
to the owner, what reason remains for valuing the property as of that
date? (2) It is impractical to ask expert witnesses and jurors to value
property situated in the midst of a neighborhood which has been de-
molished by a public project as if the project had never been initiated.
Value is based to a large extent upon the neighborhood surrounding
the property. If a neighborhood has been destroyed by the public
project, the jurors and expert witnesses are compelled to guess what
the neighborhood would have been like and how the property could
have been used if there had been no project. Just compensation should
not be based upon mere conjecture. (3) If the property is valued at
the date of trial, the owner is compelled to bear the increased risk of
vandalism and other casualty losses caused by the urban renewal proj-
ect. This seemingly conflicts with the rule that the property should be
valued as if the project had never been commenced. (4) In order to
receive just compensation, the owner must make expenditures to pro-
tect, maintain, and improve structures which no longer serve any use-
ful social function. This is economically indefensible. (5) The language
of article 1, section 19 of the Ohio Constitution and section 163.15 of
the Uniform Act indicate that the agency may not lawfully take pos-
session until after compensation is paid to the owner or secured by
deposit with the court. Therefore, neither the constitution nor the
statute manifests an intent that the taking must occur at the time of
trial.5 5 In fact, an entirely different intent is manifested. For these
reasons it should be recognized that the date of valuation need not
coincide with the date of taking. Nor does the date of valuation have
54 Supra note 34.
55 Director of Highways v. Olrich, supra note 34. The supreme court suggested in
OCrich that the traditional rule is based on constitutional and legislative intent.
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to be fixed at the time of trial. It should be based on considerations of
fairness and expediency. The rule requiring valuation at the date of
trial should be no more sacred than the practical considerations upon
which it is based.
CONCLUSION
The functions of the courts in an appropriation proceeding are
to ensure that the owner receives just compensation and to administer
the involuntary transfer of title and possession from the owner to the
appropriating agency. Those provisions of the new Eminent Domain
Act which relate to the transfer of title and possession should be inter-
preted to strike a just balance between the agency's interest in imme-
diate possession and the owner's need for a reasonable time to relocate.
If either party is permitted to use the proceeding as a club to coerce
an unjust settlement, the purpose of the act is defeated. The Uniform
Act should also be used as a basis for clarifying present case law
relating to the date of taking and the date of valuation. If properly
interpreted, the act should effect a vast improvement in the eminent
domain law of Ohio.
Frederick J. Milligan, Jr.
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